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A STUDY OF MISSOURI CASES, AND SOME
OTHERS, WHICH TREAT OF DE
FACTO CORPORATIONS
A principle which widely pervades the law is deference to an
established fact, even when it has not been established in the precise
mode prescribed by law. It has been found necessary for the con-
venient, and even for the practicable conduct of affairs, to accord, in
some instances, a measure of legality to a status that, in strictness, is
illegal. Thus in the feudal law of real property a disseisor in the
possession of a freehold estate, enjoyed the rights of ownership and
his heir the right of inheritance until the true owner recovered posses-
sion, a rule yet partly in force. A person in possession of chattels,
though without title, has the prerogatives of title as against every one
but the owner or those claiming under the latter. Governments
founded by revolution or conquest are treated as lawful and their acts
as valid, after they seem to be stable; and the actual incumbents of
public offices, albeit without a true election or appointment, are
regarded as so far entitled to their places as to render their acts valid.
With the like hope of facilitating the transaction of business, courts
have made use of this principle in the law of corporations, and thereby
have introduced the doctrine of corporate bodies de facto-a doctrine
which some commentators have questioned as an unwise extension
of the de facto principle (20 Harvard Law Review, p. 456 et seq.)
and which all will admit has proved difficult to use, as is shown by
the discordant views as to when it should be applied. As corporations
de jure in this country must be created by, or pursuant to, legislation,
the statute under which it is endeavored to form them, whether the
statute be a general law or special act, must be complied with, or else-
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they will have no right to exist as against the State which may, at any
time, put an end to them by a direct proceeding for that purpose.1
Private parties litigant sometimes seek to avail themselves of
omissions to observe statutory requirements in forming a corporation,
and then the question arises, granting there has been a failure in some
particular to observe the law, whether the intended corporation has
become one de facto and invulnerable to collateral attack, or whether
there was no corporation either de jure or de facto, so that everything
done in the corporate name was a nullity.
It is commonly said that three conditions are essential to the exist-
ence of a de facto corporation:
First, there must have been in existence at the time of the effort
to form a corporation a law by compliance with which a corporation
de jure of the class intended to be formed could be created; for ex-
ample, if the one intended was to be formed for mercantile purposes,
there must have been either a general law for the creation of such
companies, or a special act creating the particular one;
Second, there must have been an attempt, and usually it is said
an attempt in good faith, to comply with the law;
Third, there must have been corporate acts done by the company,
or in technical terms, a user of corporate powers.
In Missouri corporations must be formed now under general
statutes enacted for that purpose (Mo. Const. sec. 2, art. 12); but
prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1875 they could be created
by a special act of the Legislature, and corporate bodies still exist
under special charter granted before that date. If they were char.
tered for a limited duration, the Constitution of 1875 forbade the
amendment, renewal or extension of their charters by a special act
(Constitution, sec. 53, art. 4, clause 25).
The rule that there must be a general or special statute for the
formation of a corporation de jure of a particular kind, before one
will be recognized as existing de facto, is probably uniformly followed
by the Courts.2 This rule is reasonable and does not push the pre-
sumption that everyone knows the law so far as to defeat the purpose
of the de facto doctrine. The proposition was determined by the
Supreme Court in Douthitt v. Stinson, 63 Mo. 268, an ejectment
action involving the validity of a deed made in 1839 to the "Board of
Directors of the Town of Lancaster and Lancaster Seminary," the
deed being a link in the defendant's chain of title. Said association
1 State ex rel v. Medical College, 59 Mo. App. 264; Franklin Bridge Co. v.
Wood, 14 Georgia, 80.
2 Indiana, etc., Co. v. Ogle, 22 App. Div. 536.
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was not chartered by a special act; neither was there a general statute
in force at the time for the formation of corporations. The opinion
is an interesting one on the question of whether a corporation can
exist in this State by prescription, a point not adjudicated, but there
was a strong intimation against the possibility of corporation. The
question of whether the said grantee in the deed was a corporation
de facto and as such capable of taking title, arose on the following
facts - certain persons had set about to form the company in 1839, had
signed articles, afterwards purchased the lot described in the deed,
built a school house on part of it, sold off parts for residence lots, and
in other particulars had acted as a body corporate down to 1852.
Nevertheless, in default of a law to authorize such a corporation, it
was held not to have existed de facto when the deed was ntade, which
was therefore void, and the defendants, who claimed under it, took
no title. The opinion shows the need of a period of limitation, either
prescriptive or statutory, against an attack on corporate acts as ultra
vires; for here the Association had been transacting business in good
faith for 13 years and yet one of its transactions was held an utter
nullity and that, too, against persons who were not a party to it, but
only claimed under it.
A corporation cannot be said to exist in fact in Missouri unless a
statute has been enacted under 'which it might exist in law.
Suppose a statute authorizing a particular kind of company was
on the books when a corporation was formed, but the statute was un-
constitutional, so that the company could not exist de jure by virtue
of it-may one nevertheless exist de facto? This is a question the
Courts differ about, with the weight of decision favoring the rule that
an unconstitutional law will not support a de facto company.3 On the
other side may be cited Coxe v. State,4 Commonwealth v. Philadelphia
Co. ,yRichards v. Savings Bank. The question has never been adjudi-
cated in Missouri, but it has been twice the subject of dicta of the
Supreme Court. In the Board of Commissioners v. Shields et al,7 the
plaintiff sued as a body corporate, organized under an act assailed by
the defendants as special, a class of statutes prohibited by the Constitu-
tion except when they were passed for municipal purposes. The right
of the plaintiff to maintain the action, which was on a bond to per-
3 Eaton v. Walker, 76 Mich. 579; 6 L. R. A. 102; Brandenstein v. Hoak,
101 Calif. 131; Clark v. Cannel Coal Co., 165 Ind. 213; 112 Am. St. Rpts. 217;
Norton v. Shelby Co., 108 U. S. 442.
4 144 N. Y. 396.
'193 Pa. 236.
6 75 Minn. 196.
7 67 Mo. 247.
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form a contract for street improvement, was contested on the ground
of lack of corporate capacity of any character in the plaintiff. The
Court held the statute in question was constitutional because, though
special, it was enacted for a municipal purpose; it held, also, the de-
fendants were estopped to deny the corporate capacity of the plaintiff
as they had executed a bond of it. It thus appears, the point of whether
the plaintiff could exist as a de facto body lay outside the decision;
but the Court took occasion to quote from Cooley's work on "Consti-
tutional Limitations," an excerpt to the effect that when a corporation
is acting under color of the law, its existence cannot be collaterally
attacked, and further that "the rule would not be different if the Con-
stitution itself prescribed the manner of incorporation. Even in such
a case, proof that the corporation was acting as such under legislative
action, would be sufficient evidence of right except as against the
State, and private parties could not enter into any question of irreg-
ularity."
In Catholic Church v. Tobbein,8 the plaintiff, as a body corporate,
sued to establish a will whereby one-half of the testator's estate had
been devised to the Catholic Church in the City of Lexington, Mis-
souri. The testator died prior to the incorporation of the church and,
of course, the will therefore took effect before that date, and whatever
title passed by the will, vested in the unincorporated congregation. As
to the title in the corporate body after its formation, the Court held
that as our Constitution forbade the incorporation of a religious
society except to hold the title to real estate for church edifices, par-
sonages and cemeteries, the incorporated body could not take under
the will even though it were constitutionally created; meaning, of
course, it could take no property other than for the three objects named
in the Constitution; hence that the unincorporated congregation, or
society, would take the devise. It was not decided, however, that the
incorporated body could be given no recognition whatever if formed
in violation of the Constitution. On the contrary, the opinion quoted
from the Shields opinion, supra,-the passage therein quoted from
Cooley-approved its doctrine; saying, further, the existence of a
body acting in a corporate capacity was not open to question except
by the State in a direct proceeding "although the act incorporating it
or authorizing its organization is violative of the Constitution of the
State."
A dictum in St. Louis Colonization Association v. Hennesy,9 looks
to be in conflict with the foregoing dicta, but perhaps is not. The
a 82 Mo. 418.
9 11 Mo. App. 555.
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Court decided the plaintiff was other than a religious body and hence
had been constitutionally created, but remarked that if it had been
created in violation of the Constitution, the defendant could take ad-
vantage of the fact as a defense to the action, which was brought to
collect the subscription price of stock. If the subscription for the
stock was an original one and made with a view to organizing, then,
according to the general rule, the subscriber was not liable for the
price of his stock until the company was formed de jure.10 The Court
may have meant that the unconstitutionality of the corporation could
be urged as a defense in that sort of action, to which the de jure status
was essential, without meaning to say a de facto status is impossible
under an unconstitutional law.
Whether or not there may be a de facto company under an uncon-
stitutional statute for the formation of de jure companies, has never
been determined in this State; but whatever weight dicta on the sub-
ject have, favors the proposition that de facto status is possible.
The theory of cases to the contrary is that an unconstitutional
law is really no law, and therefore in such instances a statute to
authorize a corporation was lacking. Logically considered, this view
is sound; but when we consider the purpose of the de factor doctrine,
we will perceive the Courts will be hampered in realizing the purposes
by adhering to the logical rule, for the reason that it is so often impos-
sible to say whether a statute is constitutional or not until the court
of last resort has passed on it. Otherwise stated, the members of
the company, persons dealing with it, and persons affected by its
transactions, for example, those claiming title under its conveyances,
are charged with a much more difficult task if they must decide at
their peril whether a statute is constitutional, than when they must
merely find out if there was a statute.
Suppose a law is in force for the formation of a company of a
particular kind, but by mistake the organizers formed the company
under a different law; is de facto status acquired? There is no deci-
sion on this question in Missouri, but the Supreme Court of Georgia
held that a company organized under an unconstitutional special law,
when it might have been organized under a valid general one, was a
de facto company; i1 a case which held, however, to the rule that if
there is no statute but an unconstitutional one, an association organized
under it acquires no status.
Another point not decided in this State is whether or not a new
company formed by a consolidation without statutory authority of
10 Dorris v. Sweeney, 60 N. Y. 463; Capps v. Hasting, etc., Co., 40 Nebr. 470.
11 Georgia, etc., Railway Co. v. Mercantile, etc., Co., 94 Ga. 306.
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two constituent companies, has de facto capacity. Though there is
a decision that it has12 the clear weight of authority and of principle,
is that it has not.' 3 The question was considered, by a Federal Court
in a case turning on the Missouri law, but a decision on it was not
called for, for the reason that the statute was held to authorize the
consolidation, but the Court treated the rule as "firmly settled by
authority" that "if ample statutory power is found wanting for either
constituent company to consolidate with the other, the entire consoli-
dation is unauthorized and void." The contrary rule would permit
the formation of a new company by the bare act of the constituent
companies, which is contrary to the fundamental law that corpora-
tions cannot be formed except by the sovereignty, or with its per-
mission.
Cases conflict as to whether a company chartered under general
law, or special act, for a definite period, can continue to exist de facto
after the expiration of the period. That they can, see Bushnell v. Ice
Machine Co.14 and Miller v. Noerenberg, etc., Co.,"- the decision in the
latter case being put partly on a statute, but with the language broad
enough to sustain the general proposition. Contra, Venable Bros. v.
Granits Co.15 and Grand Rapids Bridge Co. v. Prange.iGa
The point was presented to the Supreme Court of Missouri in
Bradley v. Rappell,'0 an ejectment action wherein it was contended the
trial court had erred in excluding from the evidence two deeds of the
West Kansas City Land Company, under which the plaintiff claimed
title. The company had been created by a special act of the Legisla-
ture, which fixed no term for its duration, but the general statutes in
force at the time provided that every business corporation should con-
tinue for 20 years if no limit was prescribed in its charter. The
excluded deeds were executed by the company more than 20 years
after the date of its charter, and on trial it was argued they should
have been admitted because a conveyance by a corporation de facto
is good against collateral attack. This proposition was conceded, but
it was held that after the lapse of the statutory period, the company
could perform no act because it had ceased "to be a corporation de
jure et de facto, for the reason that there was no lav in force authoriz-
ing its existence and no law by virtue of which it might exist; and no
person, unless estopped by his own action, ought to be, or can be, pre-
vented from showing this fact apparent on the face of the law itself,
12 Shadford v. Detroit, etc., Railway, 130 Mich. 300.
13 American Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, etc., Railway Co., 107 I11. 641.
14 138 Ill. 67.
14a 31 W. Va. 836. la 35 Mich. 400.
:5135 Ga. 508; 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 446. 16133 Mo. 545.
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without the necessity of any judicial investigation, in an issue involv-
ing his own personal rights and interests." The ruling is as strong as
could be for it was made against a party who was neither connected
with the corporation, nor had dealt with it.
Therefore, a corporation cannot exist de facto in Missouri after
the lapse of the period fixed either by its charter, if it has a special
charter, or by general law' as the limit of its duration; and if acts are
done in the corporate name thereafter, they are nullities andu will be
disregarded in collateral litigation.
The rule imposes on the purchaser of land the title to which in-
cluded a conveyance by or to a corporation, the task of ascertaining
if, at the date of such conveyance, the term of corporate life was yet
unexpired, and requires a like investigation as to any other act of the
company. The rule is not necessary corollary of the doctrine that
there can be no de facto corporation in the absence of a law for the
formation of one de jure.
In State ex rel v. Medical College, 59 Mo. App. 264, the proceed-
ing was quo warranto to put an end to the defendant because it had
been in existence as long as the law permitted, namely 20 years. If
that period ran from the date of the decree incorporating the College,
which was one of the corporations to be formed by judicial decree,
the State was right. But the Court held the period began with the
filing of articles in the Secretary of State's office, in accordance with
the general statute on that subject; and further held that prior to
such filing and from the date of the Court decree, the College was a de
facto corporation.
By that case, therefore, a statutory limitation of the life of a corn-
pany begins to run with its de jure life unless otherwise provided and
not with its de facto life, if it exists de facto before it doeo de jure.
The subject of most difficulty and disagreement is the second
requisite for de facto existence, namely, there must be an attempt to
incorporate de jure, or, as is commonly said, a bona fide attempt-
that is, a sincere effort to comply with the law for the organization of
such companies. Not all the cases use the words "bona fide," or, "in
good faith," in this connection, but merely say ther must have been
an attempt to incorporate de jure. 7
The question of whether acts have been done which will con-
stitute an attempt, has been presented on various groups of facts, but
falls naturally into two principal classes:
17 Finnegan v. Noernberg, 52 Minn. 239; Toledo v. Trust Co., 95 Fed. 497;
Owensboro Co. v. Bliss, 132 Ala. 253.
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First, where the element of good faith in any particular was not
involved in the decision, and the inquiry was whether enough of the
formal acts prescribed by law for forming a corporation de jure had
been done, for the company to possess de facto capacity; or, otherwise
stated, whether the statutory acts which had been omitted were a pre-
requisite to such status."'
Second, where the element of good faith was involved, and this
class of cases may present several aspects, for example:
(a) Those where the question was, was there a sincere purpose
to form a body corporate, or was it intended from some motive to stop
short of incorporation ?19
(b) Cases where the intention to incorporate was clear, but false
statements were made in the preliminary articles, like representing
the stock to have been all subscribed and paid, when it was not, in
order to procure a charter or certificate of incorporation.W'
(c) Where the intent was to incorporate, but with a view to evade
some law; in other words, to work a fraud on the law.
5
'
(d) Where there was an attempt to incorporate, but with a pur-
pose to use the corporate body for fraudulent transactions.2
Taking up the first cases where the point to be decided was as to
the effect upon the de facto capacity of the failure to observe some
legal requirements, it is to be remarked that the results of the cases
diverge widely, principally for two reasons; namely, differences in the
respective statutes construed as indicating more or less clearly an in-
tention on the part of the Legislature to prohibit de facto capacity if
some formal act or other was not done.n
Also, the disposition of some courts to interpret such statutes
strictly, and of others to interpret them ilberally in respect of according
de facto capacity. 4
If the language of the statute leaves no doubt that the intention
was to prohibit not only a de jure but also a de facto company from
arising unless certain requirements were met, the Court must, of
course, carry out the intention; but in as much as the doctrine of de
facto capacity had become a settled part of the common law of this
country, incorporation statutes are presumed to be passed with knowl-
18Hurt v. Salisbury, 55 Mo. 310 and other cases cited infra.
19 Card v. Moore, 68 App. Div. 327, 74 N. Y. Supp. 18 and other cases
cited infra.
'o Bank v. Rockefeller, 195 Mo. 15 and other cases cited infra.
2 1 Cleaton v. Emery, 49 Mo. App. 345 and other cases cited infra.22Boatmen's Bank v. Gillespie, 209 Mo. 217.
ZJones v. Aspen Hardware Co., 21 Colo. 263, and other cases cited infra.24 Bergeron v. Hobbs, 96 Wis. 641; Bigelow v. Gregory, 73 Il1. 197, and other
cases cited infra.
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edge on the part of the legislators of the doctrine, and any enactment
tending to derogate from it should be strictly construed.
Moreover, it is easy for the Legislature to make the intent plain
that such and such a formality must be observed or no capacity de
facto will arise. Hence many courts construe statutes which prescribe
acts in the nature of conditions precedent to the formation of a cor-
poration, as intended merely to prescribe them as conditions precedent
to the formation of a de jure company and not a de facto one.2
Other courts exhibit a more technical tendency, which finds its
acme perhaps in Bergeron v. Hobbs,2 where a statute which provided
that a company should have the powers of a corporation when it filed
its certificate of organization and a copy of its constitution with the
Register of Deeds. The Court held the word "filing" meant leaving
on file, and that lodging the documents with the Register and after-
wards taking them out of the office was insufficient to confer even
de facto status, and left the organizers liable as partners. The asso-
ciation was denied even color of legal right, though the articles and
certificate had actually been recorded in the proper office. The dis-
sent of Marshall, J., is a luminous exposition of the de facto doctrine,
accompanied by a careful review of numerous cases.
Although, at first blush, equally as technical as the foregoing,
much may be said for the soundness of the decision in Jones v. Aspen
Hardware Company, " because of the strong prohibitory language of
the statute, which declared that a company should not "have, or exer-
cise, any corporate powers, or be permitted to do any business in the
State, until the fee (meaning the organization fee) shall have been
paid," and further that the Secretary of State should not file a cer-
tificate, or articles of association, until the fee was paid. The Court
held this language prevented de facto status while the fee was unpaid,
as a de facto corporation could not exist in violation of a positive law.
The point was presented in a manner to make the ruling as strong as
could be, for it denied the title to property acquired in good faith. It
was ruled that taking property was the exercise of a corporate power,
and hence prohibited. It would be a strained construction of such a
statute to hold that the exercise of corporate power before the condi-
tion precedent has been performed was valid except as against the
State.
25 Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621; Reed v. Goldneck, 112 Mo. App. 310.
" Gartside Coal Co. v. Maxwell, 22 Fed. 195; Clark on Corporations, 34d
Ed, p. 102, and cases cited in note.
2196 Wisc. 641.
221 Colo. 264.
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A few cases have made the question of status turn on whether or
not the incorporators have entirely neglected to comply with one of
the statutory requirements for affording notice to the public of the
attempt to incorporate. In one case, where the organizers had signed
articles but had not-given them publicity by filing for record, as the
law prescribed, de facto capacity was denied.u A case to the like
effect is Stevens v. Episcopal Church Historical Company et al,0
wherein at the date of certain transactions the organizers had executed
the articles, or certificate of incorporation, but had neither filed them
with the Secretary of State, nor a copy of the certificate by that official
in the office of the county clerk, nor paid the incorporation fee and
taxes, the steps prescribed by law. The Court held the bare execution
of the certificate "without any action directing or authorizing the
filing thereof, and without the filing thereof, did not constitute even
an attempt to comply with the requirements of the statute, and created
no liability and imposed no obligation on the part of the parties who
signed it to perfect the incorporation," further, that it was a mere
agreement among the members and they transacted business as part-
ners. The Court said that some of the statutory steps must be taken
in an attempt to comply with the law, and the mere execution of a
paper which was not filed and did not become a public record, was
insufficient and might be questioned collaterally.
The rule as to what steps must be taken towards incorporating
for de facto status to arise, is not clear in this State, for the reason
that the most oft-cited case on the point has been somewhat discredited,
and is probably unsound. In Hurt v. Salisbury, 31 and two cases which
followed it, Richardson v. Pitts" and Martin v. Fewell,33 the decisions
were that an act done in the name of a manufacturing and business
corporation before it had filed articles of association in the office of
the Secretary of State, was a nullity and left the members liable as
partners, or if not as partners, at any rate personally liable. In Martin
v. Fewell, the ruling was that they were partners, whereas in Richard-
son v. Pitts, the Court said whether they occupied that relation or not
they were individually responsible for the act which had been done in
the corporate name. The facts of these cases, so far as they bear on
the point in hand are similar and it will be sufficient to examine the
first and leading one.
29 ohnson v. Corser, 34 Minn. 355.
W 140 Ap. Div. 570; 125 N. Y. Sup. 573.
3 55 Mo. 310.
33 71 Mo. 128.33 79 Mo. 401.
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An attempt had been made to incorporate the North Missouri,
etc Agricultural and Mechanical Association under section 2 of
article 7, Ist Wagner Statutes, 332, or the General Statutes of 1865,
chapter 62, section 2, page 367. That was the article for the formation
of business companies, and pursuant to it, articles of association were
duly acknowledged and recorded in the Recorder's Office of the
proper county, but were not filed with the Secretary of State as
required by section 4 of article 1, page 289, 1st Wagner Statutes, or
section 2, chapter 62, page 367 of the General Statutes of 1865. The
latter section provided that a copy of the articles of association of
any corporation organized under the laws of the State, should be filed
with the Secretary of State "and the corporate existence of such
corporations should date from the time of filling of such articles; and
a certificate by the Secretary of State under the seal of the State
that said corporation had become duly organized shall be taken by
all courts in this State as evidence of the corporate existence of
such corporations." A note had been executed for the North Missouri,
etc Agricultural and Mechanical Association and it was held to
be the note of the members who had signed it as directors, and not
the note of the company, because when it was signed, the corporation
was not capable of borrowing money or executing a note; that the
statute intended, in saying "the corporate existence of such corporation
shall date form the time of filing the copies of said articles" to fix
a date the opinion said, "when the corporation was fully authorized
to transact all business for which it was created." But at that time,
the particular statutes under which the Association had been formed
provided for the signing and acknowledgment of a certificate (i. e.
articles of association) by the incorporators and for recording it in
the Recorder's Office of the proper county; and then proceeded as
follows: "the persons so acknowledging and giving said certificate,
and their associates and successors, shall for a term not exceeding
twenty years next succeeding the recording of such certificate, be a
body corporate and by such name they and their successors shall be
entitled to have and possess and enjoy all the rights and privileges
conferred by law upon corporations subject to the provisions of this
chapter, as hereinafter specified," I, Wagner Statutes, section 2, article
7, page 332. The language which is quoted has been altered since,
to harmonize it with the general section above quoted for the filing
of articles of association of all corporations with the Secretary of
State; and instead of saying that after the recording of the signed
and acknowledged articles, the associates shall enjoy all the privileges
Washington University Open Scholarship
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conferred by law upon corporations for a specified term, requires the
Secretary of State to give a certificate that the corporation has been
duly organized, and says the associates shall, for a term running
from the date of said certificate of the Secretary of State, be a body
corporate 4 It seems clear that at the time the association in ques-
tion in Hurt v. Salisbury was formed, it became a corporation under
the provisions then in force, at the date of recording its articles; and
not only an organized corporation, as was said in the opinion in the
Hurt case, but one which possessed and enjoyed "all the rights and
privileges coniferred by law on corporations." Hence, it was compe-
tent to execute the note sued upon. The case has never been over-
ruled, but in Granby Mining, etc. Co. v. Richarda,:" the Supreme
Court says its doctrine ought not to be extended. In point of fact,
the decision was extreme even if there had been no statute to con-
sider on the inquiry of when the power to do business began except
the one for recording the articles with the Secretary of State; for
not only had the articles been properly signed and acknowledged,
but notice of them had been given by one of the required recordings,
namely in the office of the Recorder of Deeds. It should be noted
that in none of the three cases last cited, was the de facto doctrine
discussed under that name, the court confining itself to deciding when
a corporate act would be treated as void for want of capacity in the
supposed corporation, but the de facto principle was, of course,
involved. The tone of the opinion in Granby Mining Co. v. Richards
is opposed to that of Hurt v. Salisbury, but the two decisions are not
necessarily in conflict. The action was on promissory notes and an open
account. Some of the notes had been signed by the Missouri Zinc
Company by ".ben Richards, president," and he was the defendant.
The evidence was clear that the plaintiff believed, when the notes
were taken, the Missouri Zinc Company was a corporation and extended
credit to it as such; also that the defendant supposed the same and
had no thought he was doing business as a partner with his associates.
The contention against the existence of the Missouri Zinc Company
was that its articles had not been filed in the office of the Circuit
Clerk of the county where the business was to be transacted but only
a duplicate in the office of the Secretary of State, whereas both
filings were required. The case was distinguished from Hurt v.
Salisbury on the ground that the special act under which the Granby
Mining Company has formed did not make filing in the Circuit
Clerk's office a condition precedent to corporate capacity.
34 1 Revised Statutes, 1909, sections 3340 and 3341.
s 95 Mo. 106.
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The case of Finch v. Ullman,38 called for a decision of whether
the Springfield Hotel Company could be a grantor and grantee of
land, no certificate having been issued by the Secretary of State,
and, in fact, as appears from the briefs, the article had not been
filed in his office. The rule in Hurt v. Salisbury was invoked that
the company could not exist de facto or de jure until this filing
occurred. The opinion speaks of lack of a certificate from the
Secretary of State, omitting to remark upon the more important
fact of neglect to file the articles with that office. Hence the decision
does not, in words, clash directly with Hurt v. Salisbury, but in
truth it does. The point in decision was that a statute authorized
the incorporation of hotel companies, and as the one in question had
been formed and had exercised corporate functions its right to do
so could not be tested in a collateral proceeding, in short, that it
possessed de facto capacity. This judgment was according to sound
de facto principles and most precedents in this State.
The most that can be said on the question of what are the formal
steps required by the statute that must be taken for the de facto status
to arise, there being no point made about good faith, is that according
to Hurt v. Salisbury and its congeners, the proceedings must go as
far as filing articles with the Secretary of State; at any rate in the
instances of a manufacturing and business company; but that it is
doubtful, if the point were squarely presented, whether that doc-
trine would be maintained.
The case of St. Joseph, etc. Railway Co. v. Shambaugh,3 7 ought
to be noticed becaused it draws a clear distinction, which is some-
times lost sight of between the effect of a statute which prescribes
condition precedent to be performed before a corporation can come
into existence, and the effect of a statute which merely prescribes
condition precedent to the right of the company to transact business,
or exercise certain corporate powers. The plaintiff was seeking to
condemn the defendant's property under a statute which began by
saying "A company is hereby incorporated called the St. Joseph and
Iowa Railway Company," etc. One defense interposed was that the
company was unincorporated and consequently lacked authority to
exercise the franchise of eminent domain, the reason assigned being
that the company had failed to perform certain conditions precedent
contained in the act. No fact is mentioned in the opinion which indi-
cates the basis of this contention, as no condition precedent, either
to corporate life or to the transaction of business, appears. However,
" 105 Mo. 255.37 106 Mo. 577.
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the Court said "where the act of incorporating does not in and of
itself, confer corporate capacity, but provides for the doing of certain
things, upon the doing of which the company shall become a body
corporate, the performance of these things constitutes conditions prece-
dent, and until performed the company has no corporate existence.
If, however, the charter confers corporate capacity without any condi-
tions precedent, acceptance of the charter is all that need be shown."
The particular point at issue should be kept in mind, namely, whether
the Railway Company could exercise eminent domain; for there are
cases holding that this can be done only by a de jure corporation. If
the Supreme Court meant that no company could be one de jure until
it had complied with conditions precedent, the proposition is sound
by all the authorities; and in view of the opinion in Granby Mining
Co. v. Richards, supra, written by the same Judge who wrote the
opinion in the Shambaugh case, this is probably all that is meant. In
other words, it was meant to hold that none but a de jure company
could make use of eminent domain, and that there could be no de jure
company until conditions precedent to the formation of a corporation
had been performed, if such were prescribed.
The particular point to be noted, however, is that where a charter
confers corporate capacity in so many words and afterwards prescribes
acts to be done before the corporation can engage in any business, the
latter conditions do not prevent the company existence as a corporate
body.
The same doctrine is more fully expounded in Wells Co. v.
Gastonia Cotton Co.,3s cited and approved in the Shambaugh case.
A point undecided in this State is whether the certificate of
the Secretary of State is conclusive that articles of association have
been filed with him, and that they sufficiently comply with the statutes.
May the certificate be relied on as a determination that the law has
been so far observed, as regards formal steps, as to make possible the
de facto character? In the Rockefeller and Gillespie opinions 0 and in
others remarks are made that the incorporation proceedings involved
were regular on their face as though such appearance of regularity was
essential to the de facto defense, even when the official certificate had
been issued. But it is declared in the Rockefeller opinion that the
certificate takes the place of a special act of the Legislature, charter-
ing a company; and if this be true in the widest sense, the certificate
will create a company. It is reasonable that the filing of something in
the nature of articles with the Secretary of State should be required,
38 198 U. S. 177.
9 195 Mo. and 209 Mo.
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as a basis for the exercise of his authority and in default for which
his actions would be void; it is reasonable, too, that what is filed
should not wholly lack the statutory requirements; for example, that
it must be in the form of articles of agreement and signed and
acknowledged by enough persons to constitute the minimum number
that may form a corporation. Even in courts of general jurisdiction
there must be pleadings for the court to act upon in a case.
It has proved difficult to find a decision directly in point on the
question, such as have been found being those wherein it did not appear
that an official certificate was required by statute, but only the filing in
the proper office of articles. These cases hold that where no articles
of agreement are filed, or only such as do not comply with essential
requirements there can be no de facto character. Alk v. Crandall;40
Abbott v. Smelting Co. ;41 Lusk v. Riggs;" Kaiser v. Bank.' In the
last case a Kansas statute was construed which required the articles
to be acknowledged before filing with the Secretary of State, and
it seems they were neither acknowledged nor appeared to be. The
court held the bank could not be a corporation in any capacity without
the acknowledgment to the articles of at least as many signers as the
statute required for the formation of a banking company. See,
however, Buffalo etc. Railway Co. v. Cary."
In view of what is said in Bank v. Rockefeller' about the Secretary
of State's certificate taking the place of a special character, and the
observations in that and other cases, to the effect that the papers
on which the Secretary acted were apparently regular, no effort will
be made to state what the rule in Missouri is on this question. The
difficulty of ascertaining from adjudged cases to what extent com-
pliance with statutory regulations and forms prescribed for forming
corporations, is necessary to create de facto capacity, is noticed in
De Witt v. Hastings, 45 a case well worth reading. The Court said
"How much must be done to make a colorable charter, or how much
may be omitted, it has not been. found necessary in the cases to decide.
In the cases to which our attention has been called, the defect was
of minor importance. Most of the steps had been taken, and it has
generally been called an irregularity. What particular step in the
process, designed by law to be complete wholly, is essential; and what
may be deemed not essential, has not been decided."
4 j 1 Sandf. Ch. 177.
414 Neb. 416.
'070 Neb. 718.
'356 Ia. 104.
4426 N. & 71.
4540 N. Y. Super. 463.
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We will now turn our attention to cases which involve consider-
ation of how far the acquisition of de facto status depends on the
good faith of the incorporators, premising what is to be said with
the statement that to concede good faith is a factor in the problem,
is to introduce a confusing element. According to practically all
the authorities, a de facto corporation is a real entity and its acts
just as valid as those of one de jure as against every party but the
State. Now, if you allow that, whether an association has de facto
capacity, or not, turns on the good or bad faith of the incorporators,
then a difference must be made as to the validity of any particular
transaction accordingly as it is with an innocent party, or with one
who had knowledge of the fraudulent intent of the incorporators;
which is to say, there may be a corporation de facto as against one
person and not as against another. This difference appears in Christian
& Craft Grocery Co. v. Fruitdale Lumber Co., 46 a case frequently
citel. The action was against the defendants as.partners, who insisted
they did not sustain that relation but were doing business as a
company de facto. The decision turned on the bona fides of the
defendants in their effort to form the corporation and the matter was
treated as a question of fact for the jury, and that upon the issue
evidence tending to prove the following facts was competent; no fee
had been paid, as the statute required, before the Secretary of State
could issue a certificate; no money nor property of value was paid in
for the capital stock; no meeting of directors had been held; the
affidavits as to subscriptions of stock made and paid, were false; the
pretended corporation was a sham; the purpose in forming it being
to enable the defendants to carry on business without incurring liability
as partners and without the company possessing any assets wherewith
to meet its debts.
It is obvious that one jury might find one way, and another
another way, and so whether or not there was a corporation would
depend on the particular verdict. No harm might result from this
in the case cited, but suppose the Fruitdale Lumber Company had
been grantee in a deed aiid in litigation that deed had formed a link
in the title of a party to a piece of property as occurred in Stinson
v. Douhitt and many other cases. The party claiming under the deed
would be liable to have his title defeated on the ground that the com-
pany had never acquired capacity to take as grantee, because it was
never a de facto company by reason of fraud in its organization. Of
course, no court would tolerate such a result, but it only could be
46121 Ala. 340.
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escaped by holding that a person who took in ignorance of the fraud
was unaffected by it. In other words, that, for the purpose of pro-
tecting an innocent party, the company would be held to have been
a corporation and a competent grantee, though it would be denied de
facto status in an action against the incorporators. But this result
violates the whole theory of the de facto doctrine, which is that such
a corporation is a good one against everyone but the State, and pro-
tects the members from personal liability for, acts done in its name.
The first sub-division of the good faith cases consists of those
where there was no real purpose on the part of the persons engaged
in the enterprise to bring into existence the corporate body, but, on
the contrary, an intention to do enoughi to enable them to carry on
business under the corporate guise while stopping short of actual
incorporation, or if there was at first the purpose to incorporate
it was abandoned.
In Card v. Moore, 7 it appeared that Card and Moore, who were
residents of Connecticut, and Crandall, a resident of New York,
agreed to form the Salisbury Carbonate Iron Company under the
laws of Connecticut, and to that end executed and filed articles in
conformity to Connecticut Law, the filing being in the otlce of the
clerk of the town of Salisbury, where the company was to be located.
They also published them in a newspaper of the county, as the law
provided, but did not file them with the Secretary of State of Connec-
ticut. Said law declared that a copy of the articles of association of a
corporation certified by the Secretary of State and on file in his office,
should "be prima facie evidence of the due formation or existence and
capacity of such corporation." The promoters of the enterprise did
not file with the Secretary of State, because their purpose was merely
to secure a company name, under which Card & Moore might transact
business as partners, in accordance with a partnership agreement they
had previously made. Their defense to the action, the facts of which
need not be further stated, was that the company was so far organized
as to constitute one de facto; but the point was ruled against them,
for the reason that they had been acting in bad faith; that is, they had
never intended to form a de jure company, but had intended to stop
short of that result.
In Weir Furnace Co. v. Bodwell,48 the contract in suit was made in
the name of "Kansas City Bale Tie Co., by A. G. Bodwell, president,"
Bodwell having been authorized to make it by the promoters of an in-
tended company. Twenty days later than the company was formed
4768 Ap. Div., N. Y. 327.
48 73 Mo. Ap. 389.
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under the name of Standard Manufacturing Company. Martin v.
Fewell and other cases were followed in holding the associates answer-
able on the contract made prior to incorporation. The opinion states
that at the date of the making "no articles of corporate association had
then been signed or acknowledged; or if so, the same were never
filed with the Secretary of State as required by statute." This shows
only a bare intent to organize a company, and action in its name before
taking steps towards organizing does not give de facto protection.
In Simmons v. Ingram,49 the defendant was made to answer on a
contract as a partner for the reason that he and others had agreed
to form a corporation but never did, yet conducted business under
the guise of Charles H. Gage Mining and Smelting Company, a
corporation. It does not appear the associates took any step towards
incorporating.
It was said in Queen City Furniture, etc. Co. v. Crawford,m
"under the facts disclosed in this case the corporation had no existence;
there was simply an immatured intention of the parties to form a
corporation." There had been articles signed, but the original project
was abandoned and subsequently, after the purchases in suit, a
different company was formed.
To the like effect is Ellis v. Brand,r1 wherein one of the defend-
ants was exonerated from a liability sought to be imposed on him,
upon the theory'that he was a partner of the man who had contracted
the debt in suit, because they did business as an incorporated company
after they had abandoned their purpose to form the company. It was
conceded the defendant would have been liable had this been true, but
the court held no business was transacted by the two as a company
after abandonment of the intention to incorporate.
From those cases it is clear that a mere intention to incorporate
will not protect associates from personal liability on obligations con-
tracted in the name of the intended company, and that this is true
whether the company is never formed, or is formed shortly after the
obligation was contracted.
In Sexton v. Snyder, 2 a judgment was affirmed against the de-
fendants as partners for services rendered the plaintiff after the
defendants had tried to incorporate but had failed because the Secre-
tary of State refused to grant a certificate. The defense was, as
to the immediate point, that the defendants had continued to conduct
49 78 Mo. App. 603.
50 127 Mo. 356.
51 176 Mo. App. 383.
52119 Mo. App. 668.
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business as and in the name of a corporation, subsequent to their
abortive effort to obtain corporate capacity.
Therefore under that authority associates do not acquire. de facto
capacity by persisting in the exercise of corporate powers after the
official charged with the duty of granting them de jure capacity has
'refused to do so.
Regarding the effect on de facto capacity of fraud in procuring a
charter or a certificate of incorporation, from the Secretary of State or
other official authority charged with the duty of passing on preliminary
proceedings, our Supreme Court from first to last has refused to treat
such fraud as a factor, holding instead that it affords ground only for a
proceeding by the State to end the further exercise of its franchises by
the company. This proposition was declared first in Kayser v. Trustees
of Bremen," a suit to enjoin the defendants from collecting a tax;
the opinion in which said, by way of dictum, it "cannot be shown in
defense to the suit of a corporation that the charter was obtained by
fraud." Courts more readily uphold public corporations against attacks
for irregular or illegal creation, because they are instrumentalities
or agencies of government, like officers; but the stated doctrine pre-
vails as to private corporations.
In Bank v. Rockefeller, et al.," the object of the action was to
hold the defendants liable as individuals on obligations of the Siegel,
Saunders Commission Company, upon these allegations: the defendants
had attempted in bad faith to incorporate said company, which there-
fore had never become a corporation either de jure or de facto; the
articles of association were not acknowledged by two persons named
as incorporators; further, the articles showed the capital stock had
been fully paid when none had been, and the incorporators had
agreed among themselves it should not be. On the face of the articles,
the subscribers appeared to have acknowledged them. The case went
off on a demurrer to the petition and, in passing on the demurrer, the
court construed the sections of the statutes bearing upon the point.6
Section 955 reads: "Whenever any corporation shall be organized
under the laws of this State it shall be the duty of the officers of said
corporation to file with the Secretary of State a copy of the Articles
of Association or incorporation, and the corporate existence of such
corporation shall date from the filing of said copy of such articles;
and a certificate by the Secretary of State, under the Seal of the State,
u 16 Mo. 88.
54195 Mo. 15.
5 R. S. 1899, sec. 955, now sec. 2975 of R. S., 1909, and sections 1313 and
1314, R. S. 1899, now sections 3340 and 3341, R. S. 1909.
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that said corporation has become duly organized, shall be taken by all
the courts of this State as evidence of the corporate existence of such
corporation; a certified copy of said certificate of the Secretary of
State shall be filed and recorded in the office of the Recorder of
Deeds of the county in which the company is organized."
That section occurs in the article providing generally for the
formation of corporations, and the other two in the article for form-
ing manufacturing and business companies. To form that kind of
company, two sections relating thereto provide for acknowledgment
of the articles by all subscribers; recording them in the office of the
proper Recorder of Deeds; filing a certified copy in the office of the
Secretary of State; a certificate by said Secretary that the company has
been duly organized, and the amount of its capital, which certificate
is made evidence of corporate existence. The statutes further say
"The persons so acknowledging such articles of association, and their
associates and successors, shall, for the period not to exceed fifty
years next succeeding the issue of such certificate by the Secretary of
State, be a body corporate," etc. Considering the effect of the statutes
for forming manufacturing and business companies, the Court said
that after the prescribed steps have all been taken, there is no incor-
poration until the Secretary of State issues his certificate, "which
takes the place of a special Act of the Legislature prior to our Constitu-
tion of 1875." And further: "This certificate is a grant of a franchise
to become a corporation and without it there can be no corporation
de jure under our laws; and, when once issued and accepted by the
company, no one can dispute the corporate existence except the State
in a direct proceeding." To the same effect is Webb v. Rockefeller."
Those cases established these rules:
There can be no corporation de jure under our laws without the
certificate of the Secretary of State (Bank v. Rockefeller, loc. cit. 42).
When the certificate is once issued and accepted by the company,
no one can dispute the corporate existence except the State in a direct
proceeding (Ibid).
When the certificate is issued, the fact that some of the incorpora-
tors had not acknowledged the articles as they appeared to have
done and as the statute required, and the further fact that the capital
stock had not been paid as represented in the articles, did not prevent
the company from being one de facto (Ibid, loc. cit. 51).
The fraudulent incorporators were not liable on the company's
obligations either as partners or to the creditors of the company in an
16 195 Mo. 57.
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action of deceit; but were only liable for the amounts unpaid on their
shares of stock.
Suppose there is a genuine intention to incorporate completely
by complying with all legal requirements and thereby obtain a decree
or certificate from the proper public authority, but the purpose of
so doing is to evade some responsibility imposed by law; what then?
In such cases there are precedents for the proposition that no status,
either de jure or de facto, pertains to the company. The theory is
that a company cannot exist if organized in violation of a positive
statute; and clearly it could not exist of right. A striking example
of this kind of cases is Montgomery v. Forbes. 57 In order to limit
his personal liability, Forbes wished to do business under the corporate
form, and because the tax laws of New Hampshire were lighter on
corporations than those of Massachusetts, where he lived and had
his factory, Forbes procured some nominal associates in Nashua and
organized a company there, he taking all the capital stock. The laws
of New Hampshire required companies formed under them to do
their principal business in the State, but Forbes had no intention to
comply with that requirement. The case was treated as one for the
jury, like Craft & Grocery Co. v. Fruitdale Lumber Co., and the jury
found against Forbes on issues regarding his good faith in organizing
to carry on business in Nashua, but found, also, he believed there was
a valid organization when he bought goods from the plaintiffs in its
name; and the plaintiffs sold the goods to the company believing it
to be a corporation. The court held none had ever been created and
that Forbes was personally liable for the price of the goods.
Booth v. Wonderly, referred to in Boatmen's Bank v. Gillespie,
contained these facts: The Legislature of New Jersey had chartered
a company called "The Mariners Mutual Insurance Company,"
to do business at Trenton, but no company was formed at Trenton, nor
stock subscribed. Two men, Noble and Logan (seems the former
claimed said charter), fraudulently planned to organize under the
charter at Jersey City and carry on business there. No connection
was shown between Noble and the persons named as corporators in
the charter, though the charter "was in the market at Trenton." It
was required a cash capital of $50,000 should be paid in before opera-
tions on other than the mutual plan should begin. It should be said
that the charter authorized special insurance as well as mutual; that
is, of parties not members as well as those who were. The corporators,
who were sued as partners on a policy of nonmutual insurance issued
5T 148 Mass. 249.
3 7 Vroom. 250.
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after the organization at Jersey City, were not guilty of actual fraud
as Logan and Noble had been. It was held there was no de facto
company, as the law contemplated a Trenton company and an organiza-
tion there on the Mutual plan; whereas the Jersey City company
was a "stock" company and the word "mutual" was omitted from
the company's name: held further, there was an attempt to pervert the
charter from the purpose intended by the Legislature; that the charter
contemplated as bank charters do, a company of a local variety; and
held, further, "that the doctrine that the validity of incorporation can-
not be inquired into collaterally was not applicable, because the charter
does not fit the Jersey City company and was not intended for it; that
the organization was entirely outside the act and had no existence as
a corporation real or de facto."
In Cleaton v. Emery,59 defendants were sued individually for
debts contracted in name of "The National Railway Electric and
Industrial Exposition Company," a corporation that was regularly
organized on the papers, under the laws of Colorado, with a nominal
capital of one million dollars, but with a subscription of only $43,000.
The laws of Colorado permitted capital stock to be named in any
sum and held incorporators only for amount of their subscription.
The purpose, as stated in the article, was to conduct an Exposition in
St. Joseph, Missouri, but with power to establish branches in Denver
and elsewhere. The incorporators were residents of St. Joseph, and
the object of going to Colorado to organize was to evade the Missouri
Constitution about subscribing and paying for stock. It was held
State comity did not require the recognition of this company as it
was organized in fraud of the laws of both. Missouri and Colorado,
and statutes of the latter State were pointed out which impliedly
forbade the creation of such a company to do business in another
State. The incorporators were held liable as partners against the
defense that, as the laws of Colorado permitted non-residents to
incorporate there, no fraud was committed on the laws of that State,
and the company was therefore a corporation. The Kansas City Court
of Appeals said the laws of Colorado never meant to permit a company
to form under them to do its entire business in another State without
even maintaining its principal office in Colorado; further, that Mis-
souri was not bound to concede the existence of a foreign company
formed by Missouri residents to do business here.
Journal Company v. Nelson, 0 was an action against the defend-
ants as partners for a debt due the plaintiff, incurred as the obligation
5 49 Mo. App. 345.60133 Mo. App. 482.
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of "The Brant Independent Mining Company." That company was
formed in Arizona ostensibly to mine in Colorado. The Court held
that it was organized in fraud of the laws of both those States, as the
organizers did not intend the company should do any business in
Arizona or mine in Colorado, but merely that its stock, which was
represented as five million dollars when only five hundred had been
paid, should be sold in Missouri; that it was not an industrial enter-
prise as it purported to be, but a commercial one. The Court applied
the maxim that "fraud vitiates everything," held, State comity did
not require recognition of a company. thus organized and that the
defendants were liable for the debt.
Therefore in this State a corporation formed in fraud of the laws
of Missouri or a sister State, has no status to protect its members
from personal responsibility for its obligations. But we may doubt
if it would be denied de facto status, if it were necessary to accord
it to protect an innocent party. There are decisions in New York not
in harmony with the foregoing, except perhaps with Wonderly v.
Booth"' Those cases hold that the motive of organizers in incorporat-
ing in one State to do business in another, cannot'be inquired into
collaterally, a view consonant to the de facto doctrine and tending to
preserve its symmetry, instead of permitting exceptions to be intro-
duced which lead to the conclusion that a company may possess de
facto capacity as to persons who are not aware of the bad faith in
which it was formed, but not as to those who do.
The fourth class of cases wherein the lack of good faith in form-
ing a company was considered with reference to its effect on de facto
character, are those where the organizers actually intended to form a
corporation, but for the purpose of using it to defraud. Of this class
is Boatmen's Bank v. Gillespie, 2 wherein was developed a thoroughly
fraudulent scheme to form the A. J. Gillespie Commission Company,
for the purpose of floating a large amount of worthless notes made
in its name. The names of two of the pretended incorporators had
been signed to the articles by a person who assumed to sign as their
trustee, but without authority, and the signatures never had been
ratified. The Supreme Court held the defendants were not individually
liable to the plaintiff on the endorsement by the corporation of certain
note,, which the plaintiff had purchased, resting the decision on the
proposition that the certificate of the Secretary of State of the
formation of The A. J. Gillespie Commission Company, constituted
61 Demarest v. Flace, 128 N. Y. 205; Lancaster v. Amsterdam Improvement
Co., 140 N, Y. 576.
2209 Mo. 217.
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it a de facto company, notwithstanding the unauthorized signing of the
names of two men as subscribers to the articles and to the capital
stock, and notwithstanding, also, the fraudulent scheme to be carried
out by means of the corporation. The opinion said: "As to the motives
and intentions of he incorporators in obtaining from the Secretary
of State the certificate, we are of the opinion that that cannot be
inquired into in this action"; a thoroughly sound decision, but if that
kind of fraud does not lay the company's existence open to collateral
attack, why should a fraud on the law? In either case the State has
redress through a direct proceeding.
Therefore incorporating to use a company as a means of perpe-
trating fraud if the plan is so far carried out as to procure the
Secretary of State's certificate, does not prevent de facto capacity.
It is not easy to reconcile Farmers State Bank v. Kuchs,0 with
the Gillespie decision, but if the two are in conflict the latter is the
law. In the Kuchs' case an unincorporated creamery company
owned by numerous farmers had made a note to the plaintiff bank
on which E. H. Ralston was surety. H. E. Ralston, brother of
E. H., in order to protect the latter and for other dishonest motives,
promoted the formation of an incorporated creamery company to
take over the business and assets of the unincorporated one and
operate under the same name. He meant to have the note, on
which his brother was surety, taken up by the corporation and the
note of the latter given instead. He induced the defendants to be-
come subscribers for stock, articles were signed, acknowledged and
recorded, but not filed with the Secretary of State, an omission that
under Hurt v. Salisbury and Martin v. Fewell would make tire
defendants liable, in that the supposedly incorporated company was
powerless to make a note or otherwise exercise corporate power.
Its note was given io the bank, of which E. H. Ralston was presi-
dent; but he appeared to have been acting in good faith and no force
is given to either his being a brother of H. E. Ralston, or Presi-
dent of the bank. The decision was put on the fact that the de-
fendants and the other incorporators had agreed no business should
be done by the company until the Secretary of State's certificate
had been obtained; that is until the company was one de jure.
How this agreement could affect the right of the bank, which was
no party to it, to look to the organizers of the abortive company,
is not perceived. They could be relieved only on the ground that
0 163 Mo. App. 606.
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the company had de facto capacity and therefore power to make
tht note, but this would be contra Hurt v. Salisbury.
The third prerequisite of the de facto character is the exercise
of corporate powers or user; of which but little need be said for
the question of what amounts to user has not been much dis-
cussed in Missouri cases; and furthermore, by the general current
of authority, not much need be done as a corporation to satisfy
this requirement of the law. In one opinion we find this state-
ment: "Very slight evidence of user beyond this (meaning beyond
a bona fide effort to incorporate) is all that can be required."4
The mere use of the corporate name by a -body of men does not
suffice, if they have done nothing towiards complying with the law
for the formation of bodies corporate. To hold otherwise would
be to set aside the prerogative of the State to create such bodies."O
This rule is not to be taken as inconsistent with the rule according
to which a company acting under a corporate name may be
estopped to deny corporate character.6 The de facto doctrine must
be discriminated from the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate
existence, for the two are different in principle and one may be
applicable to a set of facts to which the other may not be. It has
been held that merely electing officers and the passage of a single
resolution about an executory affair, is insufficient evidence of
user; 7 and, on the contrary, it has been held that the organization
of the company, that is electing officers and setting about its busi-
ness, are essential, and that no de facto character will exist prior
to> organization.68 In one case it was ruled that the action relied
,n to prove user must point to corporate capacity and not 'be
merely such action as a partnership might take.0 This looks ex-
treme, for many acts done in the character of a corporation could
as well be done by a firm; and if they were performed as an exer-
cise of corporate power, the simple fact that they might have been
performed by a firm ought not to render them nugatory as evi-
dence of user. It has been decided that the acts relied on to prove
user must have been performed after the attempt to incorporate,
not before, and this looks reasonable. ° Proof of user may be made
"Eaton Y. Walker, 86 Mich. 579, and see to same purport Merriman v.
McGiveny, 12 Heisk. 494.65Bash v. Gold Mining Company, 7 Wash. 122.
66 Stoutimore v. Clark, 70 Mo. 471; National Insurance Company v. Bow-
man, 60 Mo. 17; Farmers, etc., Insurance Co. v. Needles, 52 Mo. 17.6TEmery v. De Peyster, 78 N. Y. Suppl. 1056.
fMartin v. Deetz, 102 Calif. 368.
"Green v. Dennis, 6 Conn. 293.
70 DeWitt v. Hastings, 40 N. Y. Super. 463.
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from books and records of the corporation, by showing therefrom
the enactment of by-laws, the passage of resolutions, and the hold-
ings of meetings of shareholders and directors. Documents, deeds
and contracts reported to have been executed in the corporate
character, are also evidence.
In Boatmen's Bank v. Gillespie,71 it was suggested that where
incorporation was applied for under general statutes, the filing of
articles with the Secretary of State may be sufficient to show ac-
ceptance of franchises, and, as the opinion implies, may be enough
to create de facto status; the question before the court being
whether such a status had been acquired.
The rule prevails in Missouri, and generally, that if after an at-
tempt to incorporate de jitre, the associates perform acts as a cor-
poration the de facto character will exist, and that such acts need not
be numerous.
In fact, it is not perceived why a single act, if clearly an exer-
cise of corporate power, should not constitute user.
Finally, we ask what is the legal effect of the de facto char-
acter. As to this question the authorities in Missouri, and else-
where, are, for the most part, clear and harmonious. The exist-
ence of such a corporation cannot be questioned collaterally. It is
not open to attack by any party except the State, and only by the
State in a direct proceeding in quo warranto to test its right to
existence. This was substantially the language of our Supreme
Court in First National Bank v. Rockefeller. 2 A de facto corpora-
tion is almost, if not quite, as much a legal body as one de jure.
As was said in Society Perun v. Cleveland,7 "A de facto corpora-
tion is a reality. It has an actual and substantial legal existence.
It is, as the term implies, a corporation." It follows that such a
corporation may take contracts, convey and transfer real and per-
sonal property, commit torts, and in fact, do all things that a de jure
corporation of the particular class is authorized to do, as long as
the State does not choose to put an end to its career; the theory
of the law being that whatever wrongful usurpation of franchises
there is, is a wrong to the sovereignty and to no one else. Some
courts hold that the powers of such a corporation do not extend
to the exercise of extraordinary franchises in derogation of com-
mon right, like the power of eminent domain. 7' This was the
71209 Mo. loc. cit. 257.
' 2195 Mo. loc. cit. 44.
73 43 Ohio St 481.
74 Hudson v. Greenhill Seminary Corporation, 113 Ill. 626, Brooklyn NV. &
N. R. Co., 72 N. Y. 245.
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doctrine in Missouri until recently. In St. Joseph & Iowa Ry. Co.
v. Shambaugh,7 a condemnation proceeding, the Court said: "The
corporate existence of the plaintiff is an issue which may be made
in a proceeding to condemn property, for if the plaintiff has no
corporate existence it has no right to prosecute this suit," citing
City of Hopkins v. Railway,M and Matter of RailwaysY" That
remark, however, was a dictum, for the court went on to show that
the plaintiff had been incorporated de jure. The question was
squarely presented in Orrick School District v. Dorton,78 a pro-
ceeding by the plaintiff to condemn a site for a school house. An
an-wer was filed which put in issue the existence of the plaintiff
a! a corporation, but its right to condemn was sustained in the
court below. The Supreme Court held that its de jure status must
appear for it to condemn, citing in support of the proposition, the
three cases last cited supra, and remarking that the rule was dif-
ferent in some other states where it had been "held that a de facto
corporation might exercise the right of eminent domain."
In School District of Columbia v. Jones,7 9 the proceeding was
the same as in the Orrick School District, namely to condemn land
for a school house site, and the rule annouinced in the latter case
was invoked against the power of the plaintiff to do so. Without
overruling the Orrick case formally, the court refused to go into
the record to ascertain whether or not the plaintiff had been organ-
ized de jure, saying: "The corporate capacity of the plaintiff cannot
thus be assailed in this collateral proceeding. A corporation of
this character cannot be called upon to defend its corporate life
every time it brings a law suit in its corporate capacity. Its cor-
porate existence and its right to exercise corporate powers can
only be inquired into at the call of the State in proceedings of quo
warranto."
Hence we may say that the rule is now in.Missouri that a pub-
lic corporation of merely de facto capacity may use the right of
eminent domain as freety as one de jure may. It will be observed
that the opinion in School District v. Jones said: "A corporation of
this character cannot be called upon to defend its corporate life,
etc " That statement leaves open, in some degree, the question of
whether a private corporation, not organized de jure, can condemn
property. Nor is there any direct adjudication of the point in this
7s 106 Mo. 557.
T (79 Mo. 100.
77 72 N. Y. 245.
T" 125 M o. 439.
75 229 Mo. 510.
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State. School District v. Hodgin,80 was likewise a proceeding to
condcmn for a school house site, in which, contrary to the rule
declared in the Orrick District case, the court held the corporate
capacity of the plaintiff could not be assailed. But remarks were
made which would extend the rule to cases of private corporations
endeavoring to use the power of eminent domain. The opinion
says: "It would be a most ruinous proposition of law to announce
that any corporation of the State, whether public or private, can
be required every time it attempts to assert a right in the courts
of justice of the State to prove the regularity of every preliminary
step taken by its promoters looking to its formation and creation,
as a preliminary test of its right to prosecute its actions begun, and
if, perchance, the action is one at law, to have this issue so raised
determined by a jury." Many cases were reviewed in Black v.
Early,8 ' which was a suit by taxpayers of a school district to en-
join the collection of taxes levied for the support of a public school
and to pay the interest on its bonds, on the ground that the dis-
trict had not been regularly formed. Of course, it was rightly held
in this particular case that the matter could not be inquired of;
and, though the case did not involve the question of whether de
jure status was essential to enable the corporation to condemn
property, the opinion quoted with approval the above excerpt of
School District v. Hodgin, wherein, by way of dictum, it is said
that neither in the instance of a public nor of a private corporation
can its power of eminent domain be restricted on the score that
it only exists de facto. That view is maintained in Central, etc. Ry.
Co. v. Ry. Co.,s 2 as it is in various other cases, many of which are
collected in Morrison v. Ry. Co.8
It is the doctrine of some courts, perhaps of many, that no
corporation except one de jure can enforce payment of prelimnthary
subscriptions to corporate stock, on the theory that the subscriber
agreed to take stock only in a regularly organized company, and
not to risk his money in one liable to extinction at the suit of the
State for usurpation of franchises.84  The rule is different as to
subscriptions made after the de facto corporation is organized and
doing business. 4 In the latter case the subscriber is supposed to
80 180 Mo. 70.
81208 Mo. 281.
82 144 Ala. 639.
93 166 Ind. 511, 527.
8A Capps v. Hastings Prospecting Co., 40 Nebr. 470; Williams v. Enterprise
Co., 153 Ind. 496; Columbia Electric Co. v. Dixon.85Farmers Mutual Telephone Co. v. Howell, 132 Ia. 22.
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be estopped by contracting with a corporation to dispute its ca-
pacity.' And a preliminary subscriber, by taking part in the forma-
tion of a company, may thereby debar himself from contesting his
liability on a subscription for lack of de jure capacity. This was
decided in Home Stock Insurance Company v. Sherwood,81 and
in Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. McPherson.$'
The question of whether a corporate capacity can be raised in
an action upon a contract of subscription to stock made prior to
incorporation, was touched upon in Haskell v. Worthington,8
which was an action on such a contract, and among other de-
fenses, it was denied that the company was properly organized, for
the reason that the entire capital stock had not been subscribed,
as required by its articles of association. The corporation in ques-
tion was the Missouri Cotton Seed Company, and, it having fallen
,nto insolvency, its assignee sued the defendant for the price of
the shares he had subscribed. The court merely said: "The com-
pany was incorporated under Sections 1 and 2, Article 7, Chapter
37, Wagner Statutes, and in conformity with the requirements of
those provisions and its corporate existence cannot be questioned
in this collateral proceeding." That remark can hardly be taken
as a decision on the point, for the court went on to hold that
Worthington was not liable, for the reason that he had agreed to
venture his money upon the understanding that the full capital
stock should be subscribed and paid, and might have been unwilling
to venture it in a company of less capital. In this connection the
court said: "For while the defendant cannot question the corporate
existence of the company * * * yet there is one thing he had
a right to rely upon, and that was that his subscription should not
be put to the hazard of the venture until the capital stock deemed
necessary to the success of the enterprise had been taken, or sub-
scribed for * * *. The right of the company to enter upon the
business for which it was incorporated and to call in subscriptions
to its capital stock, was upon condition that its capital stock, as
stated in the recorded certificate, had all been taken, or subscribed
for" That is a different proposition entirely from saying a cor-
poration cannot collect preliminary subscriptions if the proceed-
ings to form it have been irregular so that it only acquired de facto
status, In the Haskell case, it happened that the irregularity was
in not having the full capacity stock taken; which, as said, was held
to be a defense, not because the company had failed to become
WDorris v. Sweeney, 60 N. Y. 463.
IT 72 Mo. 461.
as 35 Mo. 13.8994 Mo, 500.
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one de jure, -but because the condition upon which it might call
for payment upon the preliminary subscriptions, whether it had
de jure or merely de facto capacity, had not been performed. But
it might as well happen that the irregularity was in some other
particular; for example, in not having the certificate of the Sec-
retary of State, or not properly acknowledging its articles, and the
question be raised that as the company was not one de jure, it
could not enforce the preliminary subscription. There is much
reason in the argument that none but a de jure company ought to
be permitted to enforce such subscriptions, because men, pre
sumably, subscribe for shares understanding that a company will
be formed which can make good its right to live not only against
individuals, but against the State as well. However, the intination,
or decision, in the Haskell case, is the other way.
In studying the doctrine of de facto corporations, one is apt
to doubt whether, on the whole, it has made for clearance in the
law, and for justice in its administration; whether a few simple
statutory requirements for the formation of corporations rigidly
enforced by the courts and allowed to stand without too much
tampering by legislature, would not be more practical, especially
when aided by the rules of estoppel. The principal cause of the
introduction into American law of the de facto doctrine, has been
the numerous and constantly changing legislative requirements for
the formation of corporations; but it is reasonable to believe that
in time these would become simplified and also generally under-
stood, so that they would be observed by the promoters of com-
panies.
RICHARD L. GOODE.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol3/iss4/1
